Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

Grand Peaks, a nonprofit healthcare provider, applied for a full property tax exemption for its clinics and administrative offices in Rexburg, Idaho, under Idaho Code section 63-602C. Grand Peaks argued that it qualifies as a charitable organization and uses its property exclusively for charitable purposes, providing healthcare to underserved communities regardless of patients' ability to pay. The Madison County Board of Equalization granted a partial tax exemption of sixty-five percent, citing concerns about competition with for-profit healthcare providers and the revenue generated from insured patients.Grand Peaks appealed to the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, which found that Grand Peaks qualified as a charitable organization and used its property exclusively for charitable purposes. However, the district court remanded the case to the Board for further fact-finding, suggesting that the partial tax exemption might be appropriate due to the "revenue-generating" nature of some of Grand Peaks' activities. The district court vacated the Board's sixty-five percent exemption, deeming it arbitrary and capricious.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order for remand. The Court held that Grand Peaks is entitled to a full tax exemption under Idaho Code section 63-602C. The Court clarified that the proper test for tax exemption focuses on the exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes, not the income generated from the property. The Court found substantial and competent evidence supporting that Grand Peaks' properties are used exclusively for its charitable mission. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to grant Grand Peaks a one hundred percent tax exemption for the properties at issue. Grand Peaks was awarded costs on appeal. View "Upper Valley Community Health Svcs, Inc. v. Madison County" on Justia Law

A nonprofit entity, Sports Medicine Research and Testing Laboratory (Sports Medicine), sought a property tax exemption for its South Jordan facility, claiming it was used exclusively for charitable purposes. Sports Medicine performs testing for both professional sports organizations at market rates and for government agencies and charitable organizations at discounted or no cost. It argued that the revenue from market-rate testing supports its charitable mission and that its vacant property space is intended for future charitable use.The Salt Lake County Board of Equalization denied the exemption, stating the property was not used exclusively for charitable purposes. Sports Medicine appealed to the Utah State Tax Commission, which affirmed the Board's decision. Sports Medicine then sought judicial review from the Utah Supreme Court.The Utah Supreme Court held that the property did not qualify for a tax exemption. The court reasoned that while Sports Medicine's discounted testing for charitable organizations could be considered a charitable use, its market-rate testing for professional sports organizations was not. The court emphasized that generating profit, even if used to support a charitable mission, does not constitute a charitable use of property. Additionally, the court found that the vacant portion of the property, intended for future charitable use, did not meet the requirement for current exclusive charitable use. Consequently, the court upheld the Tax Commission's denial of the property tax exemption. View "Sports Medicine Research v. Tax Commission" on Justia Law

George Moses was convicted of mail and wire fraud, money laundering, lying to the FBI, and other charges for defrauding two nonprofit community organizations he led. He used funds from these organizations for personal expenses, including a timeshare, cruise tickets, and other personal items. Moses was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Wolford, C.J.) handled the initial trial. Moses was convicted on 28 counts, but he appealed 14 of these counts. He argued that the district court improperly excluded a document he claimed was his employment contract, gave erroneous jury instructions, and that the evidence was insufficient for his convictions. He also claimed procedural errors at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the employment contract because Moses failed to authenticate it. The jury instructions were deemed proper, including those on fraud by omission and the lack of a need for a specific instruction on ratification by an authorized agent. The appellate court also found sufficient evidence to support Moses's convictions on the challenged counts, including detailed schemes of fraud and misuse of funds.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting all of Moses's arguments on appeal. The court upheld the 78-month sentence, finding no procedural errors in the district court's sentencing process. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the control of a nonprofit corporation, which was dissolved by the State due to the executive director’s failure to pay taxes and fees and renew corporate registration. Despite the dissolution, the directors and members continued the corporation’s activities, unaware of the loss of corporate status. When the issue was discovered, some individuals filed paperwork to incorporate a new entity with the same name, offices, and bank account. A national affiliate proposed elections to resolve the leadership, but the new incorporators denied affiliation with the old corporation. Elections were held, and new directors were chosen, leading to litigation over who had authority to act on behalf of the new corporation.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, ruled that the new corporation was essentially the same entity as the old one, with the same members. The court concluded that the disputed election was valid and that the newly elected individuals had authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court ousted the individuals who had filed the incorporation paperwork and awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing parties but exempted individual litigants from liability for these fees.The Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings but vacated and remanded the dismissal of one third-party claim for a more detailed explanation. The court also vacated and remanded the Superior Court’s decision to excuse individual litigants from liability for attorney’s fees, finding the reason for this ruling invalid. The main holding was that the new corporation was the same entity as the old one, and the election of new directors was valid, giving them authority to act on behalf of the corporation. View "Aiken v. Alaska Addiction Professionals Association" on Justia Law

The case involves two nonprofit organizations, the National Federation of the Blind of Texas and Arms of Hope, which use donation boxes to collect items for fundraising. The City of Arlington, Texas, enacted an ordinance regulating the placement and maintenance of these donation boxes, including zoning restrictions and setback requirements. The nonprofits challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated the First Amendment by restricting their ability to place donation boxes in certain areas of the city.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas reviewed the case. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Arlington on several counts, including the constitutionality of the setback requirement and the ordinance not being overbroad or a prior restraint. However, the court ruled in favor of the nonprofits on the zoning provision, finding it was not narrowly tailored and thus violated the First Amendment. The court enjoined Arlington from enforcing the zoning provision against the nonprofits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the ordinance was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. It found that the zoning provision, which limited donation boxes to three of the city's 28 zoning districts, was narrowly tailored to serve Arlington's significant interests in public health, safety, welfare, and community aesthetics. The court also upheld the setback requirement, finding it did not burden more speech than necessary and left ample alternative channels of communication. The court concluded that the ordinance's permitting provisions did not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint.The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment regarding the zoning provision and rendered judgment in favor of Arlington on that part. The rest of the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "National Federation of the Blind of Texas, Incorporated v. City of Arlington" on Justia Law

The case involves two Georgia non-profit organizations, New Georgia Project and New Georgia Project Action Fund (collectively referred to as "New Georgia"), and the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission. New Georgia was accused of violating the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act by failing to register with the Commission and disclose their campaign expenditures and sources. The Commission initiated an investigation and found "reasonable grounds" to conclude that New Georgia had violated the Act.New Georgia then filed a federal lawsuit claiming that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the state from enforcing the Act against New Georgia. The state appealed, arguing that the district court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court should have abstained under the Younger doctrine. The court found that the state's enforcement action against New Georgia was ongoing and implicated important state interests, and that New Georgia had an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss New Georgia's action. View "New Georgia Project, Inc. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The New London Hospital Association, Inc. (NLH), a nonprofit corporation, appealed a decision by the Superior Court dismissing its appeals from denials by the Town of Newport of NLH’s applications for charitable property tax exemptions for tax years 2015, 2017, and 2018. NLH owns a property in Newport where it operates the Newport Health Center (NHC), an outpatient treatment center. NLH applied for a charitable tax exemption for the NHC property, which was denied by the Town. NLH appealed these denials to the superior court. The court ruled that NLH established three of the four factors necessary for the exemption, but not the fourth.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the trial court’s rulings that NLH satisfied the second and third factors for charitable exemption. However, it reversed the trial court's ruling that NLH failed to prove that it satisfied the fourth factor, which required NLH to show that “any of [NLH’s] income or profits are used for any purpose other than the purpose for which [NLH] was established.” The court concluded that the practice of referring patients to Dartmouth-Hitchcock Health (DHH) for “appropriate medical care” that NLH cannot provide, does not confer on DHH a “pecuniary . . . benefit” prohibited under the fourth factor. The court also found that NLH was not required to show that the independent contractors to whom it made payments shared NLH’s charitable mission. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "New London Hospital Association v. Town of Newport" on Justia Law

Five employees of The Mayo Clinic, a Minnesota non-profit corporation, filed a lawsuit alleging that the organization failed to accommodate their religious beliefs under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The employees claimed that they were terminated for refusing to comply with Mayo's Covid-19 vaccination or testing policies. The plaintiffs sought religious accommodations for the vaccination requirement, citing their Christian religious beliefs. Mayo denied the accommodations for three plaintiffs who refused to get the vaccine. It granted vaccination exemptions to two plaintiffs, but required them to test for Covid-19 weekly, which they refused.The district court dismissed the claims, ruling that two plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under Title VII, the other plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead religious beliefs that conflict with Mayo’s Covid-19 policies, and the MHRA fails to provide relief for not accommodating religious beliefs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. The appellate court found that the district court erred in finding that two plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under Title VII. The court also found that all plaintiffs adequately pled a conflict between their Christian religious beliefs and Mayo Clinic’s Covid-19 policy. Furthermore, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's finding that the MHRA does not provide a cause of action for failure to accommodate religious beliefs. The appellate court held that the MHRA, being a remedial act, should be construed liberally to secure freedom from discrimination for persons in Minnesota, and thus provides protection against failures to accommodate religious beliefs. View "Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic Ambulance" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed a lower court's decision that the Copper River Native Association (CRNA), a non-profit corporation formed by federally recognized Alaska Native tribes, is an arm of its member tribes and thus entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The case arose when a former employee sued CRNA over her termination. The superior court dismissed her complaint, concluding that CRNA was an arm of its member tribes and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. The former employee appealed, arguing that CRNA was not entitled to tribal immunity. The Supreme Court of Alaska agreed with CRNA that the legal landscape defining the contours of tribal sovereign immunity has shifted significantly since its 2004 decision in Runyon ex rel. B.R. v. Association of Village Council Presidents. The court adopted a multi-factor inquiry to determine whether an entity is entitled to “arm-of-the-tribe” immunity. Applying this multi-factor inquiry, the court concluded that CRNA is an arm of its member tribes and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Ito v. Copper River Native Association" on Justia Law

The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU) sought to obtain records from the County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (CPANJ), a nonprofit association whose members are the twenty-one county prosecutors. The ACLU claimed that CPANJ is a public agency required to disclose records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and a public entity subject to the common law right of access. CPANJ denied the request, asserting that it is not a public agency for purposes of OPRA and is not a public entity subject to the common law right of access. The ACLU filed a lawsuit, but the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that CPANJ is not a public agency within the meaning of OPRA and that CPANJ’s records do not constitute public records for purposes of the common law right of access. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with the lower courts, holding that CPANJ is neither a public agency under OPRA nor a public entity subject to the common law right of access. The court found that the ACLU’s factual allegations did not support a claim against CPANJ under OPRA or the common law. The court concluded that a county prosecutor, who is a constitutional officer, is not the alter ego of the county itself, and does not constitute a “political subdivision” as that term is used in OPRA. Therefore, CPANJ, an organization in which the county prosecutors are members, is not a public agency for purposes of OPRA. The court also found that the ACLU did not allege facts suggesting that CPANJ is an entity upon which a common law right of access request for documents may properly be served. The judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey v. County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey" on Justia Law