Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

The Freedom Foundation was a nonprofit organization that describes itself as committed to “advanc[ing] individual liberty, free enterprise and limited, accountable government in the Evergreen State.” The Foundation brought citizen’s actions against Teamsters Local 117; Service Employees International Union Political Education and Action Fund (SEIU PEAF); and Governor Inslee, the Department of Social and Health Services, and Service Employees International Union 775 for various alleged violations of Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA). In consolidated appeals, the issue common to all was whether the Freedom Foundation satisfied the FCPA’s prerequisites before filing their citizen’s actions. In each case, the superior courts ruled the Foundation failed to meet a 10-day deadline required by the FCPA and, accordingly, entered judgment for respondents. After review, the Washington Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. With respect to the Foundation's suit against the Teamsters Local 117, the Supreme Court determined that though the superior court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings to the union, the court’s entry of judgment would have been proper as summary judgment, and was thus affirmed. This result precluded the Foundation’s other challenges to the superior court’s rulings, which were therefore not addressed. As to the union's cross-appeal of its counterclaim against the Foundation under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Foundation was not a state actor, was not wielding powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State, and therefore was not subject to suit under section 1983. View "Freedom Found. v. Teamsters Local 117" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals arose out of a complaint filed by four Georgia taxpayers in which they challenged the constitutionality of Georgia’s Qualified Education Tax Credit, Ga. L. 2008, p. 1108, as amended (“HB 1133” or the “Bill”). HB 1133 set up a tax credit program that allows individuals and businesses to receive a Georgia income tax credit for donations made to approved not-for-profit student scholarship organizations (“SSOs”). The Bill created a new tax credit statute for that purpose. Generally speaking, the SSO is required to distribute the donated funds as scholarships or tuition grants for the benefit of students who meet certain eligibility requirements, and the parent or guardian of each recipient must endorse the award to the accredited private school of the parents’ choice for deposit into the school’s account. Plaintiffs alleged: (1) the Program was educational assistance program, and the scheme of the Program violated the Constitution; (2) the Program provided unconstitutional gratuities to students who receive scholarship funds under the Program by allowing tax revenue to be directed to private school students without recompense, and also that the tax credits authorized by HB 1133 resulted in unauthorized state expenditures for gratuities; (3) the Program took money from the state treasury in the form of dollar-for-dollar tax credits that would otherwise be paid to the State in taxes, and since a significant portion of the scholarships awarded by the SSOs goes to religious-based schools, the Program takes funds from the State treasury to aid religious schools in violation of the Establishment Clause; and (4) the Department of Revenue violated the statute that authorized tax credits for contributions to SSOs by granting tax credits to taxpayers who have designated that their contribution is to be awarded to the benefit of a particular individual, and by failing to revoke the status of SSOs that have represented to taxpayers that their contribution will fund a scholarship that may be directed to a particular individual. Plaintiffs sought mandamus relief to compel the Commissioner of Revenue to revoke the status of SSOs, and injunctive relief against the defendants to require them to comply with the constitutional provisions and statutory laws set forth in the complaint. In addition to mandamus relief and injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Program was unconstitutional. The Georgia Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s finding plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their constitutional claims, or their prayer for declaratory relief with respect to those claims, either by virtue of their status as taxpayers or by operation of OCGA 9-6-24. Consequently plaintiffs failed to allege any clear legal right to mandamus relief. View "Gaddy v. Georgia Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael R. Veon, a twenty-two-year member and eventual Minority Whip of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, was entitled to $20,000 annually to cover business expenses associated with maintenance of a district office, as well as $4,000 for postage. Pursuant to House Democratic Caucus (“Caucus”) procedures, Veon could seek additional funds from Caucus leadership if he exhausted his $20,000 allocation, and it was not uncommon for Caucus members to do so. In 1991, Veon formed the Beaver Initiative for Growth (“BIG”), a non-profit corporation. BIG received all of its funding from public sources, primarily through the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development (“DCED”). Veon's Beaver County district office initially shared space with BIG, but opened two more district offices, for which the rent easily exceeded his caucus allotment. Veon was criminally charged with various offenses relating to BIG paying the district offices' rents. After some charges were withdrawn, Veon went to trial on nineteen counts. In the portion of the jury charge that was relevant to Veon’s appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court defined the pecuniary requirement in the conflict of interest statute. The statute prohibited public officials from leveraging the authority of their offices for “private pecuniary benefit;” at issue here was whether or not that benefit extended to what the trial court in this case referred to as “intangible political gain.” In addition, another issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Commonwealth could receive restitution following prosecution of a public official for a crime involving unlawful diversion of public resources. The Court concluded the trial court committed prejudicial error in its jury charge regarding conflict of interest, and that it erred in awarding restitution to the DCED. Veon's judgment of sentence was vacated, the matter remanded for a new trial on conflict of interest, and for other proceedings. View "Pennsylvania v. Veon" on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Institute, a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization, filed suit against the FEC, challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. 20104(f). The district court denied the Institute's request to convene a three-judge district court pursuant to the statutory provision that requires three-judge district courts for constitutional challenges to the BCRA. On the merits, the district court held that the Institute's claim was unavailing under McConnell v. FEC, and Citizens United V. FEC. The Institute appealed. The court concluded that, because the Institute’s complaint raises a First Amendment challenge to a provision of BCRA, 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) entitles it to a three-judge district court. In this case, the Institute’s attempt to advance its as-applied First Amendment challenge is not “essentially fictitious, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, and obviously without merit.” Therefore, section 2284 “entitles” the Institute to make its case “before a three-judge district court.” Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Independence Institute v. FEC" on Justia Law

The Independence Institute, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation, conducts research and educates the public on public policy. During the 2014 Colorado gubernatorial campaign, the Institute intended to air an advertisement on Denver-area television that was critical of the state’s failure to audit its new health care insurance exchange. The Institute was concerned that the ad qualified as an “electioneering communication” under the Colorado Constitution and, therefore, to run it the Institute would have to disclose the identity of financial donors who funded the ad. The Institute resisted the disclosure requirement, arguing that the First Amendment prohibited disclosure of donors to an ad that is purely about a public policy issue and is unrelated to a campaign. The Tenth Circuit court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Colorado Secretary of State. "Colorado’s disclosure requirements, as applied to this advertisement, meet the exacting scrutiny standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. . . . The provision serves the legitimate interest of informing the public about the financing of ads that mention political candidates in the final weeks of a campaign, and its scope is sufficiently tailored to require disclosure only of funds earmarked for the financing of such ads." View "Independence Institute v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellees in these consolidated appeals challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) the requirement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) that contraceptive coverage be provided to their plan participants and beneficiaries. Appellees included a nonprofit institution of higher learning established by the Reformed Presbyterian Church and certain Catholic Dioceses and nonprofit organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church. Because they provided coverage to the Catholic nonprofits, the Dioceses, which were otherwise exempt, were required to comply with the contraceptive coverage requirement as to the nonprofits. The nonprofit appellees were eligible for an accommodation to the contraceptive coverage requirement, under which the contraceptive services will be independently provided by an insurance issuer or third-party administrator once the appellees advise that they will not pay for those services. Appellees argued that the accommodation places a substantial burden on their religious exercise because it forces them to facilitate the provision of insurance coverage for contraceptive services and has the impermissible effect of dividing the Catholic Church. The district courts granted Appellees’ motions for a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the accommodation places no substantial burden on Appellees, and therefore, Appellees did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA claim. View "Geneva College v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Since 2004, Citizens United has produced and released 24 films on various political and religious topics. Citizens United completed a 30-minute film called "Rocky Mountain Heist," the subject of which was the alleged impact of various advocacy groups on Colorado government and public policy. The film and some of its advertising unambiguously referred to elected Colorado officials then-running for office in the general election and included footage of events where participants advocated the election or defeat of Colorado candidates. As such, "Rocky Mountain Heist" came under provisions of Colorado’s campaign-practices laws that required certain disclosures with respect to what were termed “electioneering communications” and “independent expenditures.” Citizens United brought suit against the Colorado Secretary of State federal district court to challenge under the First Amendment the disclosure provisions both on their face and as applied to Citizens United because it was treated differently from various media that are exempted from the provisions. It sought a preliminary injunction against enforcing the provisions that did not apply to exempted media. The district court denied relief, and Citizens United appealed. After review, though the Tenth Circuit agreed with much of what the district court said, it reversed: on the record, Citizens United would likely prevail on the merits, and therefore was entitled to a preliminary injunction. "In light of (1) the Colorado disclosure exemptions for printed periodicals, cable and over-the-air broadcasters, and Internet periodicals and blogs, (2) the rationale presented for these exemptions, and (3) Citizen United’s history of producing and distributing two dozen documentary films over the course of a decade, the Secretary has not shown a substantial relation between a sufficiently important governmental interest and the disclosure requirements that follow from treating Rocky Mountain Heist as an 'electioneering communication' or treating the costs of producing and distributing the film as an 'expenditure' under Colorado’s campaign laws." View "Citizens United v. Gessler" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BGVAC and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that various disciplinary charges levied against her by BGVAC and her suspension as an officer of BGVAC without a hearing violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. BGVAC is a private, non-profit membership corporation that contracts with the Town to provide emergency medical services and general ambulance services to the members of that community. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between the State or Town governmental entities and the disciplinary actions taken against her. Consequently, BGVAC's actions cannot be fairly attributed to the State or the Town and BGVAC could not be held liable under section 1983. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps" on Justia Law

Appellant Green Mountain Future (GMF) appealed the grant of summary judgment, which found that it was a political action committee (PAC) and violated a number of provisions of the Vermont campaign finance laws. GMF argued the trial court erred in not applying a narrowing construction created by the U.S. Supreme Court in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1 (1976)), to the definition of a PAC under Vermont campaign finance laws, and that without that construction the registration and disclosure laws are unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment and the vagueness doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State cross-appealed the $10,000 civil penalty assigned by the trial court, asserting that that court abused its discretion by misapplying certain factors and imposing a penalty for only one of GMF's violations. This case largely turned on the scope and continuing vitality of the "magic words" that GMF argued were required by "Buckley." GMF argued that its advertisements were purely issue advocacy and did not seek to affect the outcome of an election, in this case for Governor of Vermont. The State argued that GMF's advertisements were transparently employed to defeat the candidacy of Brian Dubie for Governor, although they did not state so explicitly. The Supreme Court held that the "magic words" were not required to make the applicable campaign finance statute constitutional. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision on summary judgment and the civil penalty, except that it remanded for reconsideration of the penalty for the violation of the identification requirement. View "Vermont v. Green Mountain Future" on Justia Law