Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against BGVAC and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that various disciplinary charges levied against her by BGVAC and her suspension as an officer of BGVAC without a hearing violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. BGVAC is a private, non-profit membership corporation that contracts with the Town to provide emergency medical services and general ambulance services to the members of that community. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between the State or Town governmental entities and the disciplinary actions taken against her. Consequently, BGVAC's actions cannot be fairly attributed to the State or the Town and BGVAC could not be held liable under section 1983. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps" on Justia Law

Appellant Green Mountain Future (GMF) appealed the grant of summary judgment, which found that it was a political action committee (PAC) and violated a number of provisions of the Vermont campaign finance laws. GMF argued the trial court erred in not applying a narrowing construction created by the U.S. Supreme Court in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1 (1976)), to the definition of a PAC under Vermont campaign finance laws, and that without that construction the registration and disclosure laws are unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment and the vagueness doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State cross-appealed the $10,000 civil penalty assigned by the trial court, asserting that that court abused its discretion by misapplying certain factors and imposing a penalty for only one of GMF's violations. This case largely turned on the scope and continuing vitality of the "magic words" that GMF argued were required by "Buckley." GMF argued that its advertisements were purely issue advocacy and did not seek to affect the outcome of an election, in this case for Governor of Vermont. The State argued that GMF's advertisements were transparently employed to defeat the candidacy of Brian Dubie for Governor, although they did not state so explicitly. The Supreme Court held that the "magic words" were not required to make the applicable campaign finance statute constitutional. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision on summary judgment and the civil penalty, except that it remanded for reconsideration of the penalty for the violation of the identification requirement. View "Vermont v. Green Mountain Future" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Association of School Administrators (SCASA) is a non-profit corporation. In 2009, Rocky Disabato sent SCASA a request for information pursuant to the FOIA. The Executive Director of SCASA refused the request, asserting that SCASA is not a public entity subject to the FOIA. Disabato thereafter filed a complaint seeking a declaration that SCASA violated the FOIA by refusing to comply with his request as well as an injunction requiring SCASA to comply with the FOIA. SCASA moved to dismiss, arguing that as a non-profit engaged in political advocacy, the FOIA unconstitutionally infringed on its free speech rights. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the FOIA did not violate SCASA's rights and reversed the circuit court's order granting its motion to dismiss. View "Disabato v. SCASA" on Justia Law

A three-person nonprofit, Free Speech, brought facial and as-applied challenges against 11 C.F.R. Sec. 100.22(b). The district court dismissed, concluding that Free Speech's claims that its First Amendment rights were violated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) were implicated only to disclosure requirements subject to exacting scrutiny and requiring a "substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest." Free Speech appealed to the Tenth Circuit. On appeal, the group argued that the district court erred in its conclusion, arguing that policies and rules of the FEC were unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and triggered burdensome registration and reporting requirements on the group that acted as the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on political speech. After careful review of the appellate filings, the district court’s order, and the entire record, the Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court. View "Free Speech v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

NOM, a nonprofit advocacy organization, appealed the district court's dismissal of its amended complaint for lack of subject-matter-jurisdiction. NOM was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that New York Election Law 14-100.1, which defined the term "political committee" for the purposes of state elections, violated the First Amendment. The court determined that NOM's case presented a live controversy that was ripe for consideration and vacated the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction. Because that conclusion prevented the district court from reaching the merits of NOM's claims, the court declined to comment on the substance of NOM's claims in the first instance. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

In 1956, Sister Ephrem of the Most Precious Blood, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary, during which, Sister Ephrem claimed, she was told: “I am Our Lady of America.” The Archbishop supported a program of devotions to Our Lady of America. In 1965 Pope Paul VI approved creation of a cloister, which lasted until at least 1977, when surviving members left and formed a new congregation, dedicated to devotions to Our Lady of America. Sister Ephrem directed it until her death in 2000. Sister Therese succeeded Sister Ephrem, who willed to Sister Theres all her property, mostly purchased with donated money. Sister Therese worked with McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp until 2007, when Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family Apostolate in the chapel in which the Virgin Mary allegedly appeared to Sister Ephrem. They sued Sister Therese, claiming theft of physical and intellectual property, fraud, and defamation. She counterclaimed, alleging theft of a statue and of the website and defamation by calling her a “fake nun.” The district court denied McCarthy’s motion that the court take notice of the Holy See’s rulings on Sister Therese’s status in the Church. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with “a reminder” that courts may not decide (or to allow juries to decide) religious questions. Determination of the ownership of the property is likely possible without resolving religious questions. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Virginia non-profit corporation organized under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, commenced this action against the Commission and the Department of Justice, contending that it was "chilled" from posting information about then-Senator Obama because of the vagueness of a Commission regulation and a Commission policy relating to whether plaintiff had to make disclosures or was a "political committee." Plaintiff asserted that it was not subject to regulation but feared the Commission could take steps to regulate it because of the vagueness of 11 C.F.R. 100.22(b) and the policy of the Commission to determine whether an organization was a political action committee by applying the "major purpose" test on a case-by-case basis. Plaintiff alleged that the regulation and policy were unconstitutionally broad and vague, both facially and as applied to it, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. The court applied the "exacting scrutiny" standard applicable to disclosure provisions and affirmed the district court's finding that both the regulation and the policy were constitutional. View "The Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc., a not-for-profit religious entity related to the Bobov Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn, appealed a Commonwealth Court ruling, asking that the Supreme Court find it is an "institution of a purely public charity" under Article VIII, sec. 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and entitled to exemption from real estate taxes. Appellant operated a summer camp in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Pike County denied Appellant's exemption request, finding that occasional use of Appellant's recreational and dining facilities by Pike County residents was insufficient to prove Appellant was a purely public charity. The Court allowed this appeal to determine if it must defer to the General Assembly's statutory definition of that term. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding its prior jurisprudence set the constitutional minimum for exemption from taxes; the legislation may codify what was intended to be exempted, but it cannot lessen the constitutional minimums by broadening the definition of "purely public charity" in the statute. View "Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Co. Bd. of Assessment Appeals" on Justia Law

The district court ordered the Governor of the State of New York and various state commissioners and agencies to make certain modifications to the State's mental health system to ensure compliance with 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d) - the so-called "integration mandate" of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court held that DAI, a nonprofit organization contracted to provide services to New York's Protection and Advocacy System under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq., lacked standing under Article III to bring the claim. The court also held that the intervention of the United States after the liability phase of the litigation had concluded was insufficient to cure the jurisdictional defect created by DAI's lack of standing. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remedial order and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roland Davis had been a resident of the Devereux New Jersey Center (operated by Defendant Devereux Foundation) since shortly before his twelfth birthday. Plaintiff was diagnosed with autism, mental retardation, pervasive developmental disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had a history of combative and aggressive behavior. Plaintiff's mother (as his guardian) filed a complaint alleging breach of a "non-delegable duty" to protect Plaintiff from harm, negligent care and supervision, and vicarious liability after a counselor assaulted Plaintiff. The trial court granted Devereux's motion for summary judgment, finding that to the extent claims were for negligence, they were barred by the Charitable Immunity Act (CIA). The court further concluded that New Jersey law does not compel imposing a "non-delegable duty" upon Devereux. The Appellate Division affirmed in part, also finding no "non-delegable duty," and reversed in part, holding that a reasonable jury could find that the counselor acted in part within the scope of her employment. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether to impose upon an institution that cares for developmentally disabled residents a "non-delegable duty" to protect them from harm caused by employees' intentional acts; and (2) whether the employee in this case could be found to have acted within the scope of her employment when she criminally assaulted the resident, thereby subjecting the non-profit facility to liability pursuant to "respondeat superior." The Court reaffirmed the duty of due care imposed upon caregivers with in loco parentis responsibilities to persons with developmental disabilities. However, applying the analysis set forth and developed by prior opinions, the parties' relationship, the nature of the risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and public policy, the Court concluded the circumstances of this case did not justify imposing on caregivers a "non-delegable duty" to protect residents from harm caused by employees' intentional acts. Furthermore, the Court held that no rational factfinder could find that the Devereux counselor's criminal assault on Plaintiff was conducted within the scope of her employment. View "Davis v. Devereux Foundation" on Justia Law