Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the taxable status of Schulmaier Hall, a building owned by the Vermont College of Fine Arts (VCFA), two-thirds of which VCFA rented to agencies of the State of Vermont (State) during the 2013 and 2014 tax years. The City Assessor of the City of Montpelier (City) found the property nonexempt for those tax years. In response, VCFA brought a motion for declaratory judgment in the trial court, and both parties moved for summary judgment. Granting summary judgment for the City, the court found: (1) that VCFA had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before moving for declaratory judgment but also (2) that the property was not exempt on the merits. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont College of Fine Arts v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a certain governmental charge imposed on Indian tribes was a tax. After the legislature amended a statute to expand the types of tribal property that were eligible for a property tax: exemption, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe applied for and received an exemption on its Salish Lodge property pursuant to the amendment. As required by statute, the tribe negotiated and paid an amount to the county in lieu of taxes. The issue before the Washington Supreme Court centered on the constitutionality of this payment in lieu of tax (PILT). The Court found that the PILT was not a tax at all but, rather, a charge that tribes pay to compensate municipalities for public services provided to the exempt property. View "City of Snoqualmie v. King County Exec. Constantine" on Justia Law

Big Cats of Serenity Springs was a Colorado-based non-profit that provided housing, food, and veterinary care for exotic animals. The facility was regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Three APHIS inspectors accompanied by sheriff’s deputies broke into the Big Cats facility without its permission to perform an unannounced inspection of two tiger cubs. But at the time the inspectors entered the facility, the cubs were at a veterinarian’s office receiving treatment, just as Big Cats had promised the APHIS inspectors the previous day. Big Cats and its directors sued the APHIS inspectors for the unauthorized entry pursuant to "Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents," (403 U.S. 388 (1971)) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting the entry was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the APHIS inspectors’ motion to dismiss the complaint and they filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the court’s failure to grant qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Big Cats’ complaint stated a claim for relief under "Bivens." No APHIS inspector would reasonably have believed unauthorized forcible entry of the Big Cats facility was permissible, and therefore Big Cats and its directors could have a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. But the Court reversed on Big Cats’ civil rights claim because the federal inspectors were not liable under section 1983 in the circumstances here. View "Big Cats of Serenity Springs v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, The Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire, A Corporation Sole, d/b/a St. George’s Episcopal Church (Church), appealed a superior court order denying its summary judgment motion and granting that of the defendant, Town of Durham (Town), based upon a finding that 24 spaces in the Church’s parking lot that are leased to University of New Hampshire (UNH) students were taxable. Until 2013, the Church received a religious tax exemption under RSA 72:23, III for its entire parking lot. In early 2013, the Town learned that the Church leased spaces to UNH students. At that time, the Town believed students leased 30 of the 37 parking spaces. Accordingly, after determining that the leased parking spaces were no longer exempt from taxation, the Town issued the Church a tax bill. After review of the Church’s arguments on appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the Church did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the leased spaces were exempt. The Court affirmed the superior court order. View "Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Diocese in New Hampshire v. Town of Durham" on Justia Law

Respondent Loreto Publications, Inc. appealed a circuit court order ruling that Loreto failed to establish that it was statutorily exempt from filing annual reports with the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office, and requiring it to file reports for fiscal years 2010 to 2014. Loreto was a nonprofit corporation organized under RSA chapter 292. Its stated purpose was “the promotion, and propagation of the Roman Catholic religion through the publication, sale, or distribution of books, magazines, pamphlets or [tracts], and the use of any other communications media, whether electronic, audio, visual, printed, written or oral.” In or around 2003, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted Loreto a tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 2008, the Charitable Trust Unit of the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office learned that Loreto was operating as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization in New Hampshire and advised Loreto that New Hampshire law required it to register with and submit annual reports. In 2009, Loreto registered with the Charitable Trust Unit but did not file an annual report for fiscal year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year. In 2013, Loreto’s 501(c)(3) status was “automatically revoked [by the IRS] for its failure to file a Form 990-series return or notice for three consecutive years.” The Interim Director of Charitable Trusts sought an order in the circuit court requiring Loreto to file its delinquent reports. Loreto moved to dismiss, arguing that “[s]ince [it] . . . is NOT a Charitable Trust, but rather a church/religious organization, [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under [RSA 547:3, II(a)] to hear this matter.” The court denied the motion. Finding no reversible error in that denial, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Attorney General, Director of Charitable Trusts v. Loreto Publications, Inc." on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

Falls City Economic Development and Growth Enterprise, Inc. (EDGE), a Nebraska nonprofit corporation, provided economic development services to the City of Falls City, Nebraska. Plaintiff, a Nebraska citizen, sought records relating to a specific economic development project in which EDGE was involved. EDGE denied the request on the basis that it was not a public entity and that its records were not public records. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint and motion for a writ of mandamus to compel production of the requested documents. The district court granted the writ, with the exception of certain documents it determined to be privileged. The Supreme Court vacated and reversed the writ of mandamus, holding that EDGE was not the functional equivalent of an agency, branch, or department of Falls City as a matter of law, and therefore, EDGE’s records requested by Plaintiff were not “public records” within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-712 and 84-712.01. Remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Frederick v. City of Falls City" on Justia Law

In August 2006, Nagel Beverage Company approached the Youth Ranch and the Idaho Youth Ranch Foundation, Inc., about the sale of the real property. Nagel was looking to sell the property as part of a 1031 exchange and offered it to the Youth Ranch for $1,136,000 below the appraised value as a noncash donation. The Youth Ranch wanted to purchase the property and began to explore financing options with Key Bank. The Ada County Board of Equalization (the BOE) denied an application for a property tax exemption that the Youth Ranch and Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC asked for resulting from the donation. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals affirmed that decision. The Youth Ranch and the LLC appealed. Ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the property was not exempt from taxation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada County Bd of Equalization" on Justia Law

The Boys and Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("BGCSA"), sought a writ of mandamus to order the Baldwin Circuit Court to dismiss a declaratory-judgment action filed against it and The Community Foundation of South Alabama by the attorney general of Alabama, Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and Ruff Wilson Youth Organizations, Inc. ("Wilson Inc.") In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators and a principal benefactor of BGCSA, executed a deed transferring to BGCSA approximately 17 acres of real estate. Contemporaneously with the execution of the deed, Wilson gave a letter to BGCSA that stated Wilson's intentions and stipulations concerning his gift of the property. The letter stated that BGCSA was "'free to ultimately dispose of this property,'" but that it was Wilson's "'desire and understanding that [BGCSA] will use the proceeds from any such disposition for [BGCSA's] facilities and/or activities in the Fairhope–Point Clear area.'" Wilson died in 1997. In 2010, the Eastern Shore Clubs filed an action in the Baldwin Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against BGCSA. The Eastern Shore Clubs alleged that BGCSA "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds from the sale of the property for its own operations, rather than for the benefit of the Eastern Shore Clubs. In 2012, the Baldwin Circuit Court entered a judgment concluding Wilson's intent was that the Wilson funds should be used for the "exclusive benefit of the Fairhope and Daphne Clubs." The Baldwin Circuit Court ordered the disbursal of the remainder of the Wilson funds. This case was the third action that has come before the Supreme Court arising out the dispute between BGCSA and the Eastern Shore Clubs over the Wilson funds. The Supreme Court concluded Section 6-5-440 compelled dismissal of this case because another action involving the same cause and the same parties ("the Mobile action") was filed first. Therefore, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its most recent order in this case, and to enter an order dismissing this case. View "Alabama et al. v. Boys And Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners the City of Valley Grande and its mayor, David Labbe, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment for the petitioners on claims asserted against them by Marcus Kelley, Yolanda Kelley, and Jeffery Barlow, Jr. The Valley Grande Volunteer Fire Department was incorporated specifically as a charity under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. In 2008, the City entered into an agreement with the fire department to which the fire department agreed to provide fire protection service to the City "without remuneration." However, the petitioners did acknowledge in the fire-service agreement that the City "ha[d] in the past and likely [would] continue to provide [the fire department] with some level of annual funding." Mayor Labbe testified that the City and the fire department are separate entities and that the City did not maintain or reserve any right of control over the fire department. In early 2011, James Barlow, Sr., and his mother, Bertha Yeager, were killed in a house fire. W. Alan Dailey, the coroner for Dallas County, pronounced Barlow and Yeager dead at the scene and directed members of the fire department to remove the remains of the deceased from the house. The plaintiffs alleged that the fire department represented that it had recovered all the decedents' remains. The plaintiffs stated that in April 2011 the family discovered a body bag at the scene of the fire that contained additional remains of Barlow. Plaintiffs sued petitioners, among others, asserting claims of negligence; wantonness; intentional infliction of emotional distress; fraud; suppression; and negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, and supervision of the individual firefighters against both the City and the mayor. Petitioners moved for a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the petitioners did not employ, supervise, or train any firefighters; that petitioners did not reserve any right of control over the fire department; that the petitioners were entitled to immunity pursuant to the Volunteer Service Act, 6-5-336, Ala. Code 1975; that the City was immune from suit for intentional torts of its agents, officers, or employees; and that the petitioners could not be liable for negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, or supervision of the individual firefighters because, they said, no master-servant relationship existed between the City and the fire department. The trial court denied petitioners' motion. Because of the procedural posture of this case, the Supreme Court addressed only those issues on immunity grounds and concluded that the agreement between the City and the fire department, as well as the donations made to the fire department by the City, did not alter the fire department's status as a "volunteer" fire department. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the firefighters were immune from liability for their negligent acts under the Volunteer Service Act. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in this case and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment for the petitioners. View "Kelley et al. v. Dailey" on Justia Law