Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc., a not-for-profit religious entity related to the Bobov Orthodox Jewish community in Brooklyn, appealed a Commonwealth Court ruling, asking that the Supreme Court find it is an "institution of a purely public charity" under Article VIII, sec. 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and entitled to exemption from real estate taxes. Appellant operated a summer camp in Pike County, Pennsylvania. Pike County denied Appellant's exemption request, finding that occasional use of Appellant's recreational and dining facilities by Pike County residents was insufficient to prove Appellant was a purely public charity. The Court allowed this appeal to determine if it must defer to the General Assembly's statutory definition of that term. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding its prior jurisprudence set the constitutional minimum for exemption from taxes; the legislation may codify what was intended to be exempted, but it cannot lessen the constitutional minimums by broadening the definition of "purely public charity" in the statute. View "Mesivtah Eitz Chaim of Bobov, Inc. v. Pike Co. Bd. of Assessment Appeals" on Justia Law

This case addressed the effect of a pooled special-needs trust created by an over-65-year-old beneficiary on his medicaid benefits. The Center for Special Needs Trust Administration appealed a summary judgment in favor of the North Dakota Department of Human Services. Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, the Center alleged that North Dakota's demand for reimbursement and its state regulations violated a paragraph of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C). The court held that the district court properly determined that section 1396p(d)(4)(C) afforded the Center a right of action under section 1983; that North Dakota did not waive its claim to recover for reimbursements and should not be estopped from making that claim; that the Center's claim was without merit; and that preemption did not apply. View "Center for Special Needs, etc. v. Olson, etc." on Justia Law

The district court ordered the Governor of the State of New York and various state commissioners and agencies to make certain modifications to the State's mental health system to ensure compliance with 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d) - the so-called "integration mandate" of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court held that DAI, a nonprofit organization contracted to provide services to New York's Protection and Advocacy System under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq., lacked standing under Article III to bring the claim. The court also held that the intervention of the United States after the liability phase of the litigation had concluded was insufficient to cure the jurisdictional defect created by DAI's lack of standing. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remedial order and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Appellees, three Nebraska non-profit organizations and a resident taxpayer, brought an action against the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission and its director, seeking a declaration that the Commissioner's regulations were illegal and void because the Commission had exceeded its authority under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act by classifying flavored malt beverages as beer rather than spirits, which were taxed at a much higher rate under the Act. The district court concluded (1) Appellees had standing to challenge the Commission's regulation, and (2) the flavored malt beverages were spirits under the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court correctly concluded that the taxpayer had taxpayer standing to assert this claim, and therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the nonprofits also had standing; and (2) the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by classifying and taxing flavored malt beverages as beer, as the Act unambiguously required flavored malt beverages to be classified as spirits. View "Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm'n" on Justia Law

King County sought ways to provide legal defense services to indigent criminal defendants. The County settled on a system of using nonprofit corporations to provide services funded through and monitored by the County's Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Over time, the County took steps to improve and make these nonprofit organizations more accountable to the County. In so doing, it asserted more control over the groups that provided defender services. Respondents are employees of the defender organizations who sued the County for state employee benefits. They argued the County's funding and control over their "independent" organizations essentially made them state employees for the purposes of participating in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Applying the pertinent statues and common law principles, the Supreme Court agreed that employees of the defender organizations are "employees" under state law, and, as such, are entitled to be enrolled in the PERS. View "Dolan v. King County" on Justia Law

During the November 2008 election season, parties Senate Majority Fund, LLC (SMF) and Colorado Leadership Fund (CLF) were registered with the I.R.S. as so-called "527" tax-exempt political organizations. In the run-up to the November 2008 election, SMF distributed eight printed political ads and one television ad and CLF distributed eight printed ads that were the subject of this dispute. None of the seventeen ads contained words or phrases that specifically directed the viewer to "vote for," "elect," "support," "vote against," "defeat," or "reject." Similarly, none of the ads included the phrase "[candidate] for [office]." The court of appeals affirmed dismissal of this case by an administrative law judge (ALJ) for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. At issue is the meaning of "expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate," as that phrase is used within the definition of "expenditure" in article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution, the Campaign and Political Finance provision. The parties contended that "express advocacy" encompassed only those advertisements that explicitly exhort the viewer, listener, or reader to vote for or against a candidate in an upcoming election. This included the use of so-called "magic words," as set forth in "Buckley v. Valeo," (424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)), as well as substantially similar synonyms of those words. Appellant Colorado Ethics Watch (Ethics Watch) argued that the category of advertisements that "expressly advocate" is more expansive and encompasses any advertisement that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The court of appeals rejected Ethics Watch's argument and held that, given the settled definition of express advocacy at the time that article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution was adopted, the category of advertisements that constitute express advocacy was intentionally limited to include only those ads that use the magic words or those that explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate. After reviewing article XXVIII and the legal context in which it was adopted as a citizen's initiative in 2002 (known as Amendment 27), the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that "expenditure" was intentionally and narrowly defined in article XXVIII to include only "express advocacy," so that it covers only those communications that explicitly advocate for the election or defeat of a candidate in an upcoming election. The Court affirmed the appellate court and remanded the case to the court of appeals to return to the ALJ to enter judgment consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Colorado Ethics Watch v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC" on Justia Law

RECAP, a tax-exempt charitable organization and owner of properties in the City of Middletown, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, challenging the legally of the City's tax assessments. In this appeal, the court was asked to determine the statute of limitations governing a taxpayer's claim against a school district for money had and received arising from an erroneous assessment of school taxes and when such claim accrued. The court held that Education Law 3813 (2-b)'s one-year statute of limitations applied and that the claim for money had and received accrued when the taxes were paid. Therefore, the court concluded that RECAP's cause of action for money had and received accrued when it paid the taxes. Even assuming RECAP's last payment was made "under protest" in October 2007, as RECAP claimed, RECAP did not commence this action until April 2009, outside the one-year statute of limitations, rendering RECAP's claim time-barred. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. View "Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v Enlarged City School Dist. of Middletown" on Justia Law

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.View "Lomando v. United States" on Justia Law

Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees. View "Dená Nená Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law