Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.View "Lomando v. United States" on Justia Law

Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees. View "Dená Nená Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Minnesota corporations seeking to advance their respective social and commercial interests, filed suit to enjoin Minnesota election laws on independent expenditures and corporate contributions to candidates and political parties and moved for a preliminary injunction. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant a preliminary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood of success. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an injunction where appellants were unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether Minnesota functionally retained a ban on corporate independent expenditures; appellants were unlikely to prevail on their claim of improper tailoring; and appellants were unlikely to prevail on the direct-contribution issue or the independent-expenditure issue.View "MN Citizens Concerned for Life, et al v. Swanson, et al" on Justia Law

The Polm Family Foundation ("Foundation") filed a suit in district court for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). At issue was whether the Foundation qualified as a public charity under section 509(a)(3) of the IRC. The court held that, in light of the broad purposes mentioned in the Foundation's articles of incorporation, the court agreed with the government that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Foundation would receive oversight from a readily identifiable class of publicly supported organizations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Foundation did not qualify as a public charity under section 509(a)(3).View "Polm Family Foundation, Inc. v. USA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living (NYCQAL), a not-for-profit association of members who operate adult homes and assisted living facilities that were regulated pursuant to 18 NYCRR Parts 485 through 48, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring, among other things, that its guidelines were enforceable and enjoining defendants from violating such guidelines. The court held that the Appellate Division properly concluded that the guidelines impermissibly restricted advocate access to facility residents and violated 18 NYCRR 485.14 and the DOH's interpretation of that regulation. The Appellate Division had a sound basis for concluding that the guidelines, which called for facility representatives to serve as intermediaries between advocates and the residents and prohibited advocates from walking through the facility without the intention of visitng with a particular resident, conflicted with the regulations and the DOH's interpretation of them. Likewise, the Appellate Division properly concluded that the guideline providing that a vistors' failure to comply with any of the guidelines would "constitute reasonable cause to restrict access" conflicts with 18 NYCRR 485.14(g). View "NY Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc. v MFY Legal Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the United States Department of Treasury, froze the assets of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Oregon (AHIF-Oregon), a non-profit organization, and designated AHIF-Oregon as a "specially designated global terrorist" pursuant to Executive Order No. 13,224. AHIF-Oregon eventually filed an action asserting that the OFAC violated a variety of its statutory and constitutional rights. The Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon, which the government had not accused of supporting terrorism, challenged certain laws that barred it from providing services to designated entities such as the AHIF-Oregon. With the exception of one claim not at issue on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that substantial evidence supported OFAC's redesignation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist, and the court affirmed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's due process claims. The court reversed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's Fourth Amendment claim and remanded for the district to determine what judicial relief, if any, was available. Finally, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. View "Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, et al v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, et al." on Justia Law

King County sought ways to provide legal defense services to indigent criminal defendants. The County settled on a system of using nonprofit corporations to provide services funded through and monitored by the County's Office of the Public Defender (OPD). Over time, the County took steps to improve and make these nonprofit organizations more accountable to the County. In so doing, it asserted more control over the groups that provided defender services. Respondents are employees of the defender organizations who sued the County for state employee benefits. They argued the County's funding and control over their "independent" organizations essentially made them state employees for the purposes of participating in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Applying the pertinent statues and common law principles, the Supreme Court agreed that employees of the defender organizations are "employees" under state law, and, as such, are entitled to be enrolled in the PERS. View "Dolan v. King County" on Justia Law

In 2009, Texas enacted a statutory scheme (the Act), Tex. Bus. Com. Code Ann. 17.921-17.926, where the Act required "for-profit entities" to make certain disclosures when collecting donated clothing or household goods through "public donation receptacles," when making telephone or door-to-door solicitations, and when making mail solicitations. Plaintiffs (charities) brought a constitutional challenge to the Act alleging that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Attorney General subsequently appealed certain portions of the district court's holding that portions of the statutory scheme were unconstitutional. The court held that the charities lacked standing to challenge the (c) provisions and therefore, the portion of the district court's opinion addressing the constitutionality of the (c) provisions was vacated. The court also held that the portion of the district court's opinion holding that part of section 17.922(d) that read "and a flat fee of (insert amount) is paid to (name of charitable organization)" was unconstitutional was affirmed. The court further held that the sold-for-profit disclosure requirements scattered throughout the Act were constitutional and the district court's contrary conclusion was reversed. Therefore, the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss any claim based on the (c) provisions for want of jurisdiction and for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. View "Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, et al. v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Appellants, nonprofit environmental organizations, appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered by the district court in an action against the EPA under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., challenging the EPA Administrator's failure to take action to prevent the construction of three proposed pollution-emitting facilities in Kentucky. The court held that the validity of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permits issued under the noncompliant State Implementation Plan (SIP), and the possible invalidity of the amended SIP, sufficiently raised a current controversy to save the litigation from mootness. The court also held that the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., did not provide a cause of action to review the EPA Administrator's failure to act under section 7477 of the CAA because her decision was an agency action "committed to agency discretion by law." Therefore, the EPA Administrator's decision was discretionary and not justiciable and thus, appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Although the district court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court affirmed the district court's action because dismissal would otherwise have been proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). View "Sierra Club, et al. v. Jackson, et al." on Justia Law

The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. 7601, authorizes appropriations to fund nongovernmental efforts to combat HIV/AIDS worldwide, with conditions that: no funds “may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution” and no funds may be used by an organization “that does not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution” (the Policy Requirement). To enforce the Policy Requirement, the Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Agency for International Development require funding recipients to agree that they oppose prostitution. Funding recipients, wishing to remain neutral on prostitution, sought a declaratory judgment that the Policy Requirement violates their First Amendment rights. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, barring the government from cutting off funding during the litigation. The Second Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. The First Amendment “prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” The Spending Clause grants Congress broad discretion to fund private programs for the general welfare and to limit the use of funds to ensure they are used in the manner intended. There is a distinction between conditions that define the limits of the spending program and specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize and conditions that seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the federal program itself. The Act’s other condition, prohibiting use of funds “to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking,” ensures that federal funds will not be used for prohibited purposes. The Policy Requirement goes further and, by its very nature, affects protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program. The Requirement goes beyond preventing recipients from using private funds in a way that could undermine the federal program and requires them to pledge allegiance to government policy. View "Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law