Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a non-profit, member-owned, water company serving rural areas of Ross County, Ohio. To finance its system, plaintiff borrowed nearly $10.6 million from the USDA. The disputed area of the county includes properties served by the city and properties served by plaintiff. Each has objected to the other's extension of new lines to the area. The district court granted plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the company is protected under the Agriculture Act, 7 U.S.C. 1926(b)(2), based on its obligations under the USDA contract, had a legal right to serve the area under a contract with the county, and did not have unclean hands. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Ross Cnty. Water Co., Inc v. City of Chillicothe" on Justia Law

Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees. View "Dená Nená Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

Attorney Marie Wheeler and the law firm of Roderick Linton, LLP appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee New Destiny Treatment Center. The Center sued Attorney Wheeler and her firm over representation of a dissident member of the Center’s board of trustees who tried to regain control of the Center. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether attorneys who were retained by the dissident member of the Center could actually be sued by the Center for malpractice. The Supreme Court found in this case that the law firm represented only the dissident trustee, not the Center. No attorney-client relationship ever existed between the law firm and the Center. Accordingly, there was no basis for the Center to maintain a cause of action against the firm. The Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment in favor of Attorney Wheeler and the law firm.View "New Destiny Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Minnesota corporations seeking to advance their respective social and commercial interests, filed suit to enjoin Minnesota election laws on independent expenditures and corporate contributions to candidates and political parties and moved for a preliminary injunction. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant a preliminary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood of success. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an injunction where appellants were unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether Minnesota functionally retained a ban on corporate independent expenditures; appellants were unlikely to prevail on their claim of improper tailoring; and appellants were unlikely to prevail on the direct-contribution issue or the independent-expenditure issue.View "MN Citizens Concerned for Life, et al v. Swanson, et al" on Justia Law

The Polm Family Foundation ("Foundation") filed a suit in district court for a declaratory judgment that it was exempt from federal income taxes under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). At issue was whether the Foundation qualified as a public charity under section 509(a)(3) of the IRC. The court held that, in light of the broad purposes mentioned in the Foundation's articles of incorporation, the court agreed with the government that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Foundation would receive oversight from a readily identifiable class of publicly supported organizations. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Foundation did not qualify as a public charity under section 509(a)(3).View "Polm Family Foundation, Inc. v. USA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living (NYCQAL), a not-for-profit association of members who operate adult homes and assisted living facilities that were regulated pursuant to 18 NYCRR Parts 485 through 48, commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring, among other things, that its guidelines were enforceable and enjoining defendants from violating such guidelines. The court held that the Appellate Division properly concluded that the guidelines impermissibly restricted advocate access to facility residents and violated 18 NYCRR 485.14 and the DOH's interpretation of that regulation. The Appellate Division had a sound basis for concluding that the guidelines, which called for facility representatives to serve as intermediaries between advocates and the residents and prohibited advocates from walking through the facility without the intention of visitng with a particular resident, conflicted with the regulations and the DOH's interpretation of them. Likewise, the Appellate Division properly concluded that the guideline providing that a vistors' failure to comply with any of the guidelines would "constitute reasonable cause to restrict access" conflicts with 18 NYCRR 485.14(g). View "NY Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc. v MFY Legal Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Bell requested that County Risk Sharing Authority (CORSA), a joint self-insurance pool whose members included the majority of Ohio's counties, provide him with certain CORSA records pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 149.43 and Ohio Rev. Code 149.431. David Brooks, the managing director of property and casualty insurance for CORSA, refused to provide copies of the records, asserting that they were not public records and that CORSA was a private corporation and not a public office subject to section 149.43. Bell filed for writs of mandamus to compel Brooks to provide copies of the requested CORSA records. The court of appeals denied the requested writs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it denied the writs relating to Bell's claim for CORSA's board meeting minutes on grounds that CORSA was not the functional equivalent of a public office for purposes of section 149.43, but (2) reversed to the extent that the court of appeals failed to consider Bell's records requests for CORSA's financial and compensation records as CORSA's status as a private, nonprofit corporation was not dispositive in regard to these claims. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a part of the United States Department of Treasury, froze the assets of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Oregon (AHIF-Oregon), a non-profit organization, and designated AHIF-Oregon as a "specially designated global terrorist" pursuant to Executive Order No. 13,224. AHIF-Oregon eventually filed an action asserting that the OFAC violated a variety of its statutory and constitutional rights. The Multicultural Association of Southern Oregon, which the government had not accused of supporting terrorism, challenged certain laws that barred it from providing services to designated entities such as the AHIF-Oregon. With the exception of one claim not at issue on appeal, the district court granted summary judgment to OFAC. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that substantial evidence supported OFAC's redesignation of AHIF-Oregon as a specially designated global terrorist, and the court affirmed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's due process claims. The court reversed the district court's rejection of AHIF-Oregon's Fourth Amendment claim and remanded for the district to determine what judicial relief, if any, was available. Finally, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. View "Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, et al v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, a non-profit Christian organization operating a residential drug treatment program and two homeless shelters, engaged in religious discrimination in providing shelter and residential recovery services in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631. At issue was the extent of the protection afforded by the FHA against religious discrimination. The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant and held that, even assuming that section 3604(a) and (b) applied to defendant's homeless shelters, the FHA's religious exemption permitted the practices challenged by plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, the court expressed no view on the merits of defendant's arguments about the proper scope of section 3604(a) and (b) and the proper definition of "residence" in section 3602(b). The court also affirmed summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim because there was no evidence to establish that defendant treated the men in its parallel drug treatment program any differently than it treated the women and the interference, coercion, or intimidation claim claim because plaintiffs had not exercised a right granted to them by section 3604. View "Intermountain Fair Housing, et al. v. Boise Rescue Mission, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-profit company that blocks unwanted bulk e-mail, maintains a list of internet protocol addresses of spam distributors, which internet service providers use to block e-mails originating from those addresses. Plaintiff, a now-defunct internet marketing company, sued for tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and defamation. The district court granted default judgment and awarded $11,715,000 in damages. When defendant changed strategy, the Seventh Circuit affirmed default judgment but vacated the award. On remand, the court awarded a total of $27,002. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in the nominal amount of three dollars. The district court properly struck most of plaintiff's evidence, either as an appropriate discovery sanction or for proper procedural reasons. The evidence did not support an award of $27,000 in actual damages because plaintiff based its damage calculations on lost revenues rather than lost profits. View "e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project" on Justia Law