Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

Between 1976 and 1984, nine plaintiffs allege they were sexually abused by a part-time counselor at the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (BGCHC), a New Jersey nonprofit. Following a 2019 amendment to the New Jersey Child Sexual Abuse Act extending the statute of limitations, these plaintiffs brought suit against BGCHC, Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA), and others, claiming damages from the alleged abuse. BGCA, federally chartered in the District of Columbia and headquartered in Georgia, was not directly involved in the alleged abuse but maintained an affiliation with BGCHC through membership requirements, support, professional development opportunities, and brand usage.In the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, BGCA moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found no general jurisdiction over BGCA but allowed for jurisdictional discovery on specific personal jurisdiction. After discovery, a motion judge held that BGCA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey based on its relationship and activities with BGCHC. BGCA appealed, and the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to establish that BGCA’s conduct related to the plaintiffs' claims of abuse. The plaintiffs then sought further review.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling. The Court held that New Jersey courts cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA because the plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to any affirmative act by BGCA directed toward New Jersey. The Court clarified that BGCA’s provision of resources, branding, and support to BGCHC did not constitute purposeful availment for the purposes of specific jurisdiction in this context. As a result, the claims against BGCA were dismissed, though proceedings against BGCHC in New Jersey continue. View "E.T. v. The Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County" on Justia Law

Renaissance Medical Foundation (the Practice) is a nonprofit health organization certified by the Texas Medical Board. The Practice employed Dr. Michael Burke, a neurosurgeon, to provide medical services to its patients. Rebecca Lugo brought her daughter to Doctors Hospital at Renaissance for brain surgery performed by Dr. Burke. The surgery resulted in permanent neurological damage to Lugo’s daughter. Dr. Burke later expressed that a retractor used during the procedure migrated into the child’s brainstem, causing the injury. Lugo filed a lawsuit alleging negligence by Dr. Burke and sought to hold the Practice vicariously liable for his actions.The trial court denied the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Dr. Burke’s negligence because it did not control the manner in which he provided medical care and that Dr. Burke was an independent contractor. The court concluded that Dr. Burke’s employment agreement granted the Practice sufficient control over him to trigger vicarious liability. The court authorized a permissive interlocutory appeal of the ruling.The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Dr. Burke was an employee of the Practice under traditional common-law factors and was acting within the scope of his employment when the alleged negligence occurred. The Practice then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a nonprofit health organization may not be held vicariously liable if exercising its right of control regarding the alleged negligence would interfere with its employee physician’s exercise of independent medical judgment. The court concluded that the Practice did not conclusively demonstrate such interference and affirmed the denial of the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "RENAISSANCE MEDICAL FOUNDATION v. LUGO" on Justia Law

A disabled woman, T.M.B., was sexually assaulted by an employee of West Mont, a nonprofit organization contracted by the State of Montana to provide community-based services for developmentally disabled individuals. T.M.B. sued both the State and West Mont, alleging they owed her a nondelegable duty of care. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding neither owed a nondelegable duty of care for the employee’s criminal acts. T.M.B. appealed.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, found that the State had satisfied its statutory obligations by contracting with West Mont to provide services and did not owe a nondelegable duty to T.M.B. because she was not under state custody or control. The court also found that West Mont did not owe a nondelegable duty, as there was no statute or rule explicitly stating such a duty existed for state contractors operating community homes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding the State, agreeing that the State did not have a close, continuing relationship with T.M.B. that would impose a nondelegable duty. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding West Mont, finding that the relationship between West Mont and T.M.B. was sufficiently close and continuing to impose a nondelegable duty under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214. The court held that West Mont had a duty to protect T.M.B. from harm due to her dependence on their care and supervision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T.M.B v. West Mont" on Justia Law

The City and Borough of Sitka, Alaska allowed an independent nonprofit organization to host a public event at a city facility. The nonprofit organization arranged for a volunteer to hang decorations in the facility; a decoration fell, injuring an event participant. The injured participant sued the City, but not the nonprofit organization, for negligence. The City brought a third-party allocation of fault claim against the volunteer. The parties sought summary judgment, and the trial court concluded that, under federal law, the volunteer could not be held financially responsible for the accident and that the City could not be held vicariously liable for the volunteer’s actions. The remaining negligence issues were decided at a jury trial; the jury determined that the volunteer and the city had not been negligent and therefore were not liable for the accident. The event participant appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment. View "Sulzbach v. City & Borough of Sitka, et al." on Justia Law

Pamela Neppel, individually and as the parent and legal guardian of Z.N., an incapacitated individual, appealed amended judgment entered after a jury trial. She also appealed denying leave to amend her complaint, an order for an amended judgment, and an order denying her motion for attorney fees and costs. Development Homes, Inc. (DHI) cross appealed an order denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Z.N., at the time of the incident giving rise to this case, was living at a residential care facility operated by DHI. Neppel was Z.N.’s mother. Neppel filed this lawsuit alleging Z.N. was raped by another resident, referred to as S.O., who lived on the same floor of the facility as Z.N.’s housemate. Neppel alleged DHI had knowledge S.O. was a sexual predator and Z.N. was susceptible to abuse, yet DHI withheld information from her about the risk of placing the two together. Neppel also alleged DHI did not immediately report the rape or provide prompt and adequate medical care for Z.N. Along with DHI, Neppel sued various DHI employees, as well as S.O.’s co-guardians. The case was tried to a jury on counts of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict awarding Neppel and Z.N. $550,000 in damages. The jury specifically awarded Z.N. $100,000 for damages caused by DHI’s negligence. The jury also awarded Z.N. and Neppel $400,000 and $50,000 in damages, respectively, for past and future severe emotional distress caused by DHI. The jury did not find any of the individually-named defendants liable. DHI filed a motion to amend the judgment asserting it was entitled to charitable immunity under N.D.C.C. ch. 32-03.3, which set liability limits for certain charitable organizations. The court granted the motion and entered an amended judgment that applied the $250,000 charitable organization liability limit. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Neppel leave to amend her complaint and the order denying her motion for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed the order denying DHI’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding Neppel’s appeal from the order for amended judgment was moot. View "Neppel, et al. v. Development Homes, et al." on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court did not err when it found that the Church did not have a special relationship with Henrie such that it had an affirmative duty to control or protect him, nor was there any issue of fact as to whether the Church had a general duty to prevent Henrie's injury. This case arose out of injuries suffered by Bryan Henrie while he was participating in a community service event organized by the Mormon Helping Hands (“Helping Hands”), a priesthood-directed program run by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the “Church”). Henrie argued on appeal that the district court erred when it dismissed his tort claim on summary judgment. Henrie was assigned to work with a crew felling burned trees and rolling or throwing the wood down an embankment on the property to be hauled away later. Later that day, Henrie was attempting to throw a tree stump down the embankment when it caught on his smock. He was pulled down the embankment by the stump, severely injuring his right knee in the process. Henrie asserted that “[a]t the very least, Defendant had a duty not to supply Plaintiff with gear or clothing that would put him or his bodily safety in danger or ultimately harm him . . . Defendant breached this duty of care.” He further asserted that “Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to use reasonable care in nominating, training, and supervising any and all of the clean-up organizers and volunteers, including those who spoke with and directed Plaintiff.” The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Church. View "Henrie v. Church of Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law