Justia Non-Profit Corporations Opinion Summaries

A three-person nonprofit, Free Speech, brought facial and as-applied challenges against 11 C.F.R. Sec. 100.22(b). The district court dismissed, concluding that Free Speech's claims that its First Amendment rights were violated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) were implicated only to disclosure requirements subject to exacting scrutiny and requiring a "substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest." Free Speech appealed to the Tenth Circuit. On appeal, the group argued that the district court erred in its conclusion, arguing that policies and rules of the FEC were unconstitutionally vague, overbroad and triggered burdensome registration and reporting requirements on the group that acted as the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on political speech. After careful review of the appellate filings, the district court’s order, and the entire record, the Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the dismissal for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court. View "Free Speech v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

NOM, a nonprofit advocacy organization, appealed the district court's dismissal of its amended complaint for lack of subject-matter-jurisdiction. NOM was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that New York Election Law 14-100.1, which defined the term "political committee" for the purposes of state elections, violated the First Amendment. The court determined that NOM's case presented a live controversy that was ripe for consideration and vacated the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction. Because that conclusion prevented the district court from reaching the merits of NOM's claims, the court declined to comment on the substance of NOM's claims in the first instance. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

In 1956, Sister Ephrem of the Most Precious Blood, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary, during which, Sister Ephrem claimed, she was told: “I am Our Lady of America.” The Archbishop supported a program of devotions to Our Lady of America. In 1965 Pope Paul VI approved creation of a cloister, which lasted until at least 1977, when surviving members left and formed a new congregation, dedicated to devotions to Our Lady of America. Sister Ephrem directed it until her death in 2000. Sister Therese succeeded Sister Ephrem, who willed to Sister Theres all her property, mostly purchased with donated money. Sister Therese worked with McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp until 2007, when Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family Apostolate in the chapel in which the Virgin Mary allegedly appeared to Sister Ephrem. They sued Sister Therese, claiming theft of physical and intellectual property, fraud, and defamation. She counterclaimed, alleging theft of a statue and of the website and defamation by calling her a “fake nun.” The district court denied McCarthy’s motion that the court take notice of the Holy See’s rulings on Sister Therese’s status in the Church. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with “a reminder” that courts may not decide (or to allow juries to decide) religious questions. Determination of the ownership of the property is likely possible without resolving religious questions. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Lake Holiday, a private community, is governed by the Association, which enacted restrictive covenants, rules, and regulations, including rules that concern speed limits, impose fines, provide for enforcement of rules by private security officers, and require residents to provide security officers with identification when requested to do so. Plaintiff owns property in the development and was driving within the development, when a private security officer measured plaintiff’s speed, pulled plaintiff over, took plaintiff’s license, detained plaintiff for a few minutes, and issued a citation. In his third amended complaint plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices of the security department were unlawful and that the rules and regulations were void and alleged breach of fiduciary duty and willful and wanton conduct and false imprisonment. The trial court granted defendants summary judgments. The appellate court held that the practice of recording drivers was not a violation of the eavesdropping statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1), nor was the security department prohibited from using radar, but that the Association was not authorized by the Vehicle Code to use amber lights on its vehicles and that stopping and detaining drivers for Association rule violations was unlawful. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, in favor of the Association. View "Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case concerned Washington Constitution article II, section 40’s refund provision. Specifically at issue is the legislature’s statutory refund program, which places one percent of fuel tax revenues into a special fund to benefit off-road vehicle (ORV), nonmotorized, and nonhighway road recreational users for fuel consumed on nonhighway roads. In 2009, the legislature appropriated a portion of this special fund for the Parks and Recreation Commission’s (Parks) general budget. The Washington Off Highway Vehicle Alliance (WOHVA), Northwest Motorcycle Association (NMA), and four individuals representing ORV users, contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the appropriation was a refund within the meaning of article II, section 40. WOHVA argued that the appropriation was not sufficiently targeted to affected taxpayers to constitute a refund despite legislative findings to the contrary. Finding no error with the appellate court's analysis of the refund provision, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Wash. Off Highway Vehicle Alliance v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a local church or the national church from which it sought to separate owned certain church property. Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River (Hope Presbyterian) had been affiliated with the national Presbyterian Church organization since its founding in 1901, most recently affiliating with the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (PCUSA), and its regional presbytery, the Presbytery of the Cascades. In 2007, the congregation voted to disaffiliate from PCUSA. The corporation then initiated this lawsuit, seeking to quiet title to certain church property and to obtain a declaration that PCUSA and the Presbytery of the Cascades had no claim or interest in any of the real and personal property in Hope Presbyterian's possession. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court quieted title in favor of Hope Presbyterian and declared that PCUSA and the Presbytery of the Cascades had no beneficial interest in any of Hope Presbyterian's property. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Hope Presbyterian held the property in trust for PCUSA. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed its decision. View "Hope Presbyerian v. Presbyterian Church" on Justia Law

The Boys & Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. ("the Club"), a nonprofit corporation, appealed a judgment entered in favor of the Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc. ("Rotary Inc."), and the Ruff Wilson Youth Organization, Inc. ("Wilson Inc."), in their action against the Club seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In 1996, B.R. Wilson, Jr., one of the incorporators of the Club and a principal benefactor, executed a "gift deed," transferring to the Club approximately 17 acres of real estate ("the property"). In March 2000, the Club sold the property and deposited the proceeds into three separate accounts, two of which were separately earmarked for the Daphne Club and for the Fairhope Club. However, in 2009, the Club discontinued its operations in Daphne and Fairhope, citing "operating deficits" as a contributing factor. It transferred the remainder of the proceeds from the sale of the property to an account in the Community Foundation of South Alabama ("the bank"). Later that year, the facilities in Daphne and Fairhope were reopened by volunteers and former Club personnel, who began operating the youth centers under their own independent management structures. Subsequently, some of these individuals incorporated Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc., under which they continued to operate the facilities in Fairhope and Daphne, respectively. Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. sued the Club, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Club "ha[d] used," or, perhaps, was "anticipat[ing] using," the proceeds for its own operations, rather than for the use of the facilities then being operated by Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. They sought a judgment: (1) declaring that the "desire and understanding" of B.R. Wilson expressed in the letter controlled the disposition of the funds, and (2) enjoining the use of the proceeds for anything but the benefit of the youth facilities as operated by Rotary Inc. in Fairhope and by Wilson Inc. in Daphne. The court ordered the termination of the "trust" and the disbursal of the remainder of the proceeds to Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc., respectively. The Club appealed, challenging, among other things, the standing of Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. to sue over distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rotary Inc. and Wilson Inc. failed to show that they had standing to challenge the Club's disposition of the proceeds of the sale of the property donated to the Club by B.R. Wilson, Jr. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and dismissed the case and the appeal. View "Boys & Girls Clubs of South Alabama, Inc. v. Fairhope-Point Clear Rotary Youth Programs, Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered on whether the recreational use immunity statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210, applied under the circumstances where a landowner, who otherwise operates an admission fee-based camp, allows a group access for no charge. During the group’s stay at the camp, plaintiff was injured when riding a slide on the property. The camp asserted recreational use immunity as a defense to the claim. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled that the camp was not immune from liability under the statute because it normally charged fees for the recreational use. This interlocutory appeal was certified after the trial court found there was likely a substantial ground for difference of opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that recreational use immunity is not available under these circumstances because the property was not open to the general public. View "Cregan v. Fourth Mem'l Church" on Justia Law

The Bridgewater State University Foundation owns three buildings and three undeveloped parcels. One building is occupied by foundation offices and the university's alumni office; another houses the university's political science department; and the third is used by the university and the foundation for receptions and fundraising. The undeveloped parcels are used by students for recreation. None of the properties is used exclusively by the foundation. The foundation permits the university to use all the properties free of charge. The Appellate Tax Board decided that the foundation was entitled to the charitable exemption from local property taxes, G.L. c. 59, Sect. 5; the Appeals Court reversed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court concluded that the foundation is entitled to the exemption. The foundation is a public charitable trust, and it is "organized and operate[s] exclusively for the benefit of" Bridgewater State University under G.L. c. 15A, sect. 37. The foundation has qualified as a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The university is an institution of public higher education and certifies that the foundation is operating "in a manner consistent with" the university's goals and policies and uses its money and assets solely for the benefit of the university. View "Bridgewater State Univ. Found. v. Bd. of Assessors of Bridgewater" on Justia Law

The court granted wife's application for discretionary appeal from the final judgment and decree of divorce. At issue was the equitable division of a closely-held non-profit corporation. The court concluded that the superior court functioned as the finder of fact, and as such, it was authorized to give credit and weight to the disputed evidence in favor of husband. The court also concluded that wife's complaints that the superior court erred in failing to consider her request for attorney fees and to award them to her because husband refused to comply with discovery and/or there was substantial disparity in the parties' financial circumstances was unavailing. View "Jones-Shaw v. Shaw" on Justia Law